RRD Compromise Text Published

On 22 December 2013 the Council of the EU published a note attaching the final compromise text of the proposed Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD) agreed with the European Parliament.  Agreement in trialogue had previously been reached on 11 December 2013.

On 20 December 2013, the Permament Representatives Committee (COREPER) of the Council of the EU also published a press release confirming that it had approved (on the Council’s behalf) the compromise text agreed with the Parliament.  The text of the RRD now needs to be formally adopted by the EU Parliament and the Council.

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Trilogue Agreement Reached on RRD

On 12 December 2013, the European Commission published a press release announcing that on 11 December 2013, Parliament and Council Presidency negotiators reached political agreement in trilogue on the proposed Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD). The Directive will enter into force on 1 January 2015 and will introduce the bail-in principle which will apply from 1 January 2016. The Directive now needs official approval by the Parliament and Council of the EU at first reading. Continue reading

FMLC Provides Additional Commentary on RRD

On 25 October 2013, the Financial Markets Law Committee (FMLC) published a second discussion document on the EU Commission’s General Approach to the proposed Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD).

The document is generally supportive of the changes made within the General Approach, but highlights a few remaining areas of concern with respect to legal uncertainty, including those set out below:

  • Bail-in: The RRD does not provide a set of principles to guide a resolution authority’s choice as to whether to convert debt to equity or whether to write-down debt.  In addition, contractual bail-in provisions may not operate in the same way as statutory bail-in provisions;
  • Valuation:  It is unclear on what basis the valuation (which must be independent) is to be carried out, notwithstanding that Article 30 of the RRD provides that the valuation should be fair and realistic.  This drafting ambiguity gives rise to legal uncertainty as to the status of a resolution action which is taken when a valuation at the proscribed standard has not been carried out, owing to practical difficulty or impossibility; and
  • General Resolution Powers:  Articles 56(1)(h) and 56(1)(l) of the RRD give a resolution authority the power to cancel or amend the terms of “debt instruments”.  However, this definition is wider than that of “capital instruments” – the term used to describe the instruments that are eligible to be ‘bailed-in’.

EU Council Publishes new RRD Proposal

On 16 July 2013, the EU Presidency published a compromise proposal amending the EU Commission’s previous compromise proposal (dated 19 June 2013) relating to the Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD).

As detailed in Annex 2 to the document, the main changes address issues such as:

  • the scope of the bail-in tool; and
  • resolution financing arrangements.

RRD Pushed Back Again

On 3 July 2013, the EU Parliament updated its procedure file on the Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD).  It seems that the RRD proposal will not now be considered until the Parliament’s plenary session scheduled for 18 to 21 November 2013, rather than the session scheduled for 21 to 24 October 2013, as was previously the case.

EU Council Agrees Approach to RRD

On 27 June 2013, the EU Council published a press release confirming an agreed position with respect to the Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD) and calling on the EU Presidency to start trilogue negotiations with the EU Parliament with a view to adoption of the RRD at first reading before the end of 2013.

The press release focuses on three areas:

  • Bail-in;
  • Resolution funds; and
  • Minimum loss absorbing capacity.

It does not contain much in the way of detail beyond that widely reported over the last week.  However, it is perhaps noteworthy that only inter-bank liabilities with an original maturity of less than seven days are to be excluded from the scope of the bail-in tool.