On 19 February 2014, the EU Council published a press release reviewing the state of play of negotiations over the single resolution mechanism (SRM).
Committed to reaching agreement over the SRM before the upcoming parliamentary elections, EU finance ministers had met the previous day in order to discuss possible adjustments to the Council’s December 2013 general approach to the SRM, with a view to giving more flexibility to the presidency in the forthcoming “trilogue” negotiations. Wiggle room was noted as existing in the following areas: Continue reading →
The Conference of Presidents Group have held intensive talks with their EP negotiators on the state of SRM play. The result is firmly-worded missive sent today from their own current President, Martin Schulz, to Commission President Manuel Barroso, summary translations in bold italic: Continue reading →
On 22 December 2013 the Council of the EU published a note attaching the final compromise text of the proposed Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD) agreed with the European Parliament. Agreement in trialogue had previously been reached on 11 December 2013.
On 20 December 2013, the Permament Representatives Committee (COREPER) of the Council of the EU also published a press release confirming that it had approved (on the Council’s behalf) the compromise text agreed with the Parliament. The text of the RRD now needs to be formally adopted by the EU Parliament and the Council.
On 2 December 2013, the Council of the European Union published a press release announcing that it has approved the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (15963/13) between the Council and the European Central Bank (ECB) relating to the single supervisory mechanism (SSM). A few days earlier on 30 November 2013, the Inter-institutional Agreement (IIA) between the ECB and the European Parliament on the implementation of procedures related to the SSM was published in the Official Journal of the EU (OJ).
On 28 November 2013, the Presidency of the EU Council published its latest Compromise Proposal (17055/13) with respect to the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Changes to the previous compromise text (15503/13) are highlighted in bold and underlined.
On 20 November 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) published a speech given by the ECB executive board member, Yves Mersch, on the ECB’s perspective on the future of the European banking union. Continue reading →
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) proposed by the EU Commission in July has suffered a fresh blow (see this blog for SRM background). On 7 October 2013, an opinion from the European’s legal service sheds serious doubt on the legality of giving a new agency wide discretion to close troubled banks under EU treaties, potentially undermining a key element of the resolution proposal.
The 26-page document warns of the pitfalls involved in giving a body too many powers and in particular states that “The legal service considers that the powers which would be conferred by the proposal of the board…need to be further detailed in order to exclude that a wide margin of discretion is entrusted to the board”. The legal opinion may cause the EU Commission to rethink the proposal, causing more delays. The first stage of the proposal which involves the European Central Bank directly supervising 130 top euro zone lenders has already been delayed to the end of 2014. The SRM which forms one of the building blocks of the EU Banking Union now needs backing of member states to become law.
On 12 September 2013, the European Parliament published a press release announcing the adoption of a package of legislative acts to set up a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for the Eurozone. The SSM legislation was adopted with very large majorities and will bring the EU’s largest banks under the direct oversight of the European Central Bank (ECB) from September 2014.
On 16 July 2013, the EU Presidency published a compromise proposal amending the EU Commission’s previous compromise proposal (dated 19 June 2013) relating to the Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD).
As detailed in Annex 2 to the document, the main changes address issues such as: